The cataphatic theology of the Catholic West and the apophatic theology of the Orthodox East

To speak more concretely, we find ourselves faced here with the difference between the cataphatic theology more peculiar to the Catholic West, and especially to Thomas Aquinas and his school, on the one hand, and on the other, the apophatic theology which prevails in the works of the Fathers of the Orthodox East. For the former (cataphatic) theology, the notion of God is essentially identical with that of being, even though He be perfect and absolute Being. Therefore all the attributes and perfections of God are nothing but attributes and perfections analytically deduced from the notion of being. Of course they must be conceived not literally, but analogically, but this does not make much difference to the question. Thus from the notion of perfect being are deduced the unity of God and His absolute simplicity. At the same time this perfect being is conceived of as lying within the domain of logic. In other words the fundamental laws of logic, understood as ontological laws and as the ideal foundation of being, are considered by the exponents of cataphatic theology to extend their action so far as to include God Himself (since He also is being) and even to find their foundation in Him. Because of all this the `cataphatics' tend to think that every objective 'distinction' in God, which they interpret as the distinguishing in Him of `parts' ontologically different from His 'whole', is incompatible with the idea of His absolute perfection : each 'part' is less than the whole, and therefore (according to the laws of logic) necessarily less perfect than the whole and so destroys by its existence the absolute perfection of God. It goes without saying that the notion of antinomy is foreign to this kind of theology which supposes it to be an imperfection of -thought or of theological construction. We do not propose here to go into a critical examination of these characteristic features of cataphatic theology and will only remark that its fundamental positions appear to us hard to reconcile with the dogma common to all Christians of a God Three in One, with the teaching of Dionysius the Areopagite on the    

or with the teaching of St John Damascene on the 'types' and `ideas' of all things eternally existing in God [1]. 

Contrasting with the ideas of cataphatic theology we find those of apophatic theology, the fundamental positions of which have been examined at the beginning of this chapter in connexion with Gregory Palamas's teaching on God in Himself. We will now say once more that in accordance with the spirit of apophatic theology, the application to God of such notions as being, substance, etc., though not altogether erroneous, is yet inexact and purely relative and does not define God as He is in Himself, since God is not being (however perfect) but transcends it as its Creator (though even this word does not express God as He is). Therefore also the attributes of being cannot be simply taken over and made into attributes of the Godhead—this is precisely what is done in the 'cataphatic' system—in the matter of divine simplicity. As little may the fundamental laws of logic be applied to Him, precisely because of their existential and therefore creaturely character. Of course God is not below the laws of logic (as He is not below being in the sense of non-being) (146), but transcending them He is not 'included' in them, and as a result of this, our conceptions of God must necessarily be antinomic. And this theological antinomy (which must not be confused with the ordinary logical contradiction—cf., e.g. note 83) is not merely the inadequacy of our thought to grasp the divine nature, but is objectively grounded in God Himself as something ineffably existing in Him (independently of the apprehending subject). Such is the doctrine of the Three-personal Godhead combining in Itself antinomically the notions of trinity and unity ; such is the teaching of the Church on the one hypostasis and the two natures, divine and human, of the Incarnate Word of God, in Whom the unity of person coexists with the duality of natures in a way which is incomprehensible to us. Such also is the teaching of Gregory Palamas on the divine 'super-substance' and its energies, on their identity—distinction, their unconfusedness —inseparability, their communicability —incommunicability, their knowableness — inaccessibility. Gregory's defence of the simplicity and non-composition of God together with the distinction in Him of substance from energies bears the same character of antinomy. And of course `substance' and 'energies' are no more 'parts' of the divine `whole' than each of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity is a part, but each contains Him whole and entire in itself; with this difference that the energies express God not hypostatically nor substantially, but only in His undiminished act. The failure to grasp these fundamentals of Gregory's theology (shortly described by us as 'cataphatic' and 'antinomical') which he has in common with the foremost representatives of the Orthodox patristic tradition, is, to our mind, one of the chief causes of the misunderstanding of his teaching by most of his opponents. 

[1] It is interesting to note that St Augustine understood the divine simplicity rather differently from the Eastern Fathers since he identified the divine substance with its attributes and operations (cf. e.g., his statements that God 'ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam, quod habet, hoc est. .. Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod vel possit amittere, tel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet'—De Civ. Dei II, 1o). At the same time, however, since he held the opinion that the ideas of all things are in the mind of God, he was forced to explain this by admitting that God in His knowledge by which he knows the ideas of creatures, is 'simpliciter multiplex' (De Civ. Dei, 12, 18). Thereby St Augustine admits the antinomial idea of the divine simplicity and his attitude in this is related to that of the Eastern Fathers (although in other ways his teaching on divine simplicity is at the origin of the scholastic view on the subject). 

Krivoshein - The ascetic and Theological teaching of gregory Palamas 

Profane knowledge and Salvific knowledge according to St. Gregory Palamas

The profane knowledge (kosmike gnosis) does not accomplish salvation. That which is true in secular wisdom is not necessary and does not lead to salvation. One may not know anything about the experimental sciences and yet have knowledge of God (theognosia) which leads to salvation. He rejected the Barlaamite and Scholastic claims that intellectual knowledge (gnosis) is essential for the knowledge of God. The Scholastics as represented by Barlaam had as a starting point that the knowledge of God is rational and that what is super-natural is unknown of God. Therefore, we have the dichotomy and juxtaposition of the two realities; natural and super-natural. For Saint Gregory Palamas "knowledge of God is based on the suprarational experience of the prophets and Saints; it transcends all rational knowledge and cannot, there-fore, be understood or defined in rational categories, or dealt with dialectically and syllogistically, taking non-existent universals as a starting point." Saint Gregory Palamas sees reality in spiritual experience of the vision of God (tes theoptias) not in imaginary symbols, but in symbols that are essentially real in our experience of reality.

The way to attain knowledge of God is by purity of heart, by purifying our souls from improper imagination. The only way man can attain the purity which is necessary for the knowledge of God is "by purifying his active (power) by works, his cognitive (power) by knowledge, and his contemplative (power) by prayer."

"It can never be achieved by anyone except through perfection in works, through perseverance (in the ascetic way), through contemplative prayer." Prayer in quietude (hesychia) is necessary to attain knowledge of God. True knowledge is attained through purification (katharsis). In the union with God one attains the vision of "all immaterial knowledge" (pares ahylou gnoseos). This is not by "sensible symbols" (aisiheton ton symbolon) but by the communion of the divine uncreated light.

The perfect saving knowledge was given to man by Christ, and in the sacred Scriptures one can find "eternal life." This being perfect knowledge (gnosis) and by the practice of the divine sayings: "therefore all that you wish man to do to you, even so do you also to them; for this is the law and the prophets," (Matt. 7:12) one moves toward perfection. Those who believe in Christ attain the supra-conceptual knowledge (hyper ennoian gnosis) which is the end of the commandments. We do not receive God's knowledge (theognosia) from created beings but from the uncreated light, which is the glory of God and revealed to us through Christ.

Knowledge, therefore, according to Saint Gregory Palamas is not intellectual nor dialectical but apodictic and experiential. One can say it is existential because it is directly experienced in contemplation (theoria) and not derived by syllogisms and abstractions.

[...]

The Greek Orthodox Fathers who are in the tradition in which Palamas stands teach the distinction between the divine uncreated essence and the divine uncreated energies. Those who are worthy partake of the uncreated energies since the essence is unapproachable, and this distinction does not disrupt the unity of God. This distinction is contrary to the Western confusion of the uncreated essence with the uncreated energies and this is by the claim that God is "Actus Purus." To avoid pantheism Western theologians teach that grace is created and that the creature does not participate in the divine essence. However. the scholastics advocate the communion or vision of the divine essence by the "elect" or saints in the "Beatific vision" which will take place in the future life. The late V. Lossky states it this way: "Palamas' opponents are defending a philosophical notion of the divine simplicity when they affirm the perfect identity of the essence and the energy of God." And elsewhere he says that "Christianity is not a philosophical school for speculating about abstract concepts, but is essentially a communion with the living God," and that "there is no philosophy more or less Christian. Plato is not more Christian than Aristotle." For that reason one must not look for a "philosophy of essence" in the Greek Fathers.

From the book Introduction to St. Gregory Palamas by George C Papademetriou